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In this paper we study the effect of contract design on the performance of railway maintenance 
in Sweden, using a panel data set over the period 2003-2013. The effect of incentive intensity 
is estimated, showing that the power of incentive schemes improve performance as measured 
by the number of infrastructure failures. In addition, we show that the structure of the 
performance incentive schemes has resulted in a reallocation of effort from failures not causing 
train delays to failures causing train delays, with a substantial increase in the former type of 
failures. This signals a deteriorating asset condition, which highlights the need to consider the 
long-term effects of this incentive structure. Overall, this work shows that the design of the 
incentive structures has a large impact on the performance of maintenance, and that the 










Government agencies often procure goods and services instead of producing it in-house. This 
procurement accounts for a significant part of national economies, with estimates at 12 per cent 
of the gross domestic product (GDP) in OECD countries (OECD 2017). Cutting costs and 
improving quality are frequently stated goals when introducing competitive tendering and 
contracting of services previously offered by a state-owned monopoly. However, careful 
contract design is required in order to achieve the goals of such reform, with appropriate 
specification and monitoring of quality along with incentive schemes to deal with moral hazard 
and adverse selection. Whether or not different contract designs have the desired effects needs 
to be tested empirically, both for policy reasons and to assess if theoretic arguments for certain 
designs are valid in the current case. 
This paper contributes to this line of research by studying the incentive structures in 
railway maintenance contracts in Sweden, and their impact on the frequency of infrastructure 
failures. More specifically, the purpose with this paper is to provide empirical evidence on the 
effect of incentive intensity on the frequency of failures as well as the effect of tilted 
performance incentive schemes, where the latter differentiate between failures causing train 
delays and failures not causing train delays. 
Sweden chose to gradually expose its maintenance of railways to competitive tendering 
in 2002. One objective of the transfer from in-house to tendered production of rail maintenance 
was to provide scope for innovation (Banverket 2000). To do so, firms (contractors) are given 
degrees of freedom by the contracts: most of the maintenance contracts are said to be outcome 
or performance based,1 meaning that the contractor is not told exactly which (or the level of) 
activities that are to be carried out. A fixed payment is received by the contractor who needs to 
 




meet a set of requirements with respect to the quality of maintenance. The purpose is to give 
the contractor an incentive to develop the maintenance production. We are therefore in a 
second-best situation where the client (the IM) can (and has in this case chosen to) observe the 
outcome rather than prescribing the input. This can, however, create a moral hazard situation 
as the contractor’s actions may not be optimal for the client. In addition, the contractor can 
obtain a higher rent when information about its efficiency (technology) is not known to the 
client, which is the problem of adverse selection. This asymmetry in information means that 
the client has to make a trade-off between inducing effort (via fixed price contracts) and 
extracting rent from the contractor (via cost-plus contracts); the power of the incentive scheme 
is a central parameter in this trade-off (Laffont and Tirole, 1986).  
The maintenance contracts in Sweden have an incentive scheme with a varying power, 
which comes in the form of different reimbursement rules for the contractors with respect to 
infrastructure failures. In short, the fixed payment for the (expected number of) activities 
required when an infrastructure failure occurs is not completely fixed due to the reimbursement 
rule. Depending on the level used for this rule, the contractors are either reimbursed for a large 
share of the cost of rectifying a failure, or they need to cover most of their expenses from the 
fixed payment (this is further described in section 2). Importantly, differences in this 
reimbursement rule imply varying incentives to prevent infrastructure failures from occurring. 
When designing the future maintenance contracts, it is useful to know whether this incentive 
scheme has an effect or not, and if there is an effect: what is the impact of a change in the power 
of the incentive scheme? 
The fixed payment to the contractors is also connected to a performance incentive 
scheme, in which the contractor receives an award and/or penalty for its performance. Here we 
can note that a contractor will make a trade-off between different tasks within a project if these 
are rewarded differently and the tasks are substitutes; see for example the seminal paper by 
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Holmström and Milgrom (1991). Indeed, the performance incentive schemes in the 
maintenance contracts in Sweden are tilted, which can affect the attention to different tasks and 
consequently the outcome of the project. Considering that train delays are costly to society, this 
tilted structure of the performance incentive scheme is expected. However, one needs to ask 
whether it is has the desired effect or not, and what are the costs and benefits of the effect? 
Estimating the performance scheme’s impact on the number of train delaying failures viz-à-viz 
other failures (not causing train delays) is a first important step in this analysis. 
The theoretic work on contracts and information asymmetry in the principal-agent 
framework is extensive (for textbook treatments, see for example Laffont and Tirole, 1993, 
Laffont and Martimort, 2002 and Salanié, 2005). Wunsch (1994) is an early example of an 
empirical study on contract design within the field of procurement and regulation, where menus 
of linear contracts are calibrated for transit firms. Gagnepain and Ivaldi (2002) study the 
regulatory schemes for French urban transport and compare these to the optimal policies, while 
Roy and Yvrande-Billon (2007) use the same study object (in a different time period) to 
estimate differences in technical efficiency between regulatory schemes and fixed-price and 
cost-plus contracts. Other examples within the transport field are the study by Dalen and 
Gómez-Lobo (2003) - showing that high-powered incentive schemes reduce operating costs for 
bus companies in Norway - and the study by Piacenza (2006) with similar results for Italian 
public transport. 
To the author’s knowledge, an econometric test of the effect of incentive intensity has 
not been made in field of rail infrastructure management. Nonetheless, Vickerman (2004) 
provides an exploration of incentives in transport infrastructure maintenance, and a case study 
on incentives in rail maintenance contracts is made by Stenbeck (2008). Moreover, studies on 
the power of incentive schemes in procurement and regulation usually compare different types 
of contracts (for example fixed-price contracts compared to cost-plus contracts). We can 
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however make use of the variation in the incentive intensity in the cost-reimbursement contracts 
that are used for railway maintenance services in Sweden. This enables an estimation of the 
effect of incentive intensity within the same contract type. 
There is a wide literature on the effects of performance payments; see for example 
Lazear and Oyer (2013) for a review of theories and empirical findings on incentives and 
performance (among other topics) in personnel economics.2 A recent study on procurement and 
performance incentives is made by Lewis and Bajari (2014), showing that penalties induced 
effort in high-way construction contracts (with welfare improvements and low contractor costs 
according to simulations). Our study adds to this literature by estimating the effects of 
performance incentives in rail infrastructure management, focusing on the reallocation of 
efforts from one type of failure to another. 
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the main ingredients of the 
railway maintenance contracts, and the related research questions of the paper. A description of 
the data is provided in section 3. The models to be estimated and the estimation method are 
presented in section 4. The results are presented in section 5, followed by a discussion of our 
findings in section 6. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2.0. Maintenance contract design and research questions 
Most of the railway maintenance contracts in Sweden are performance-based contracts. These 
contracts are a mix between a fixed price and a cost-plus contract, i.e. a fixed payment is 
received for certain activities while others have variable payments. 
Most contracts have a fixed payment for the (expected number of) activities required when 
an infrastructure failure occurs. However, the cost for each activity is capped; a clause states 
 
2 Other examples are Rosenthal and Frank (2006) and van Herck et al. (2010) who provide reviews of empirical 
evidence in the health sector, Podgursky and Springer (2007) present evidence in the education sector and Devers 
et al. (2007) is a review of evidence on executive pay and firm performance. 
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when the cost of rectifying a failure is included in the fixed payment to the contractor. It also 
indicates that when the cost is higher than the cap, the contractor is paid according to the 
variable cost for the amount above the specified cost level. For intuition, consider the following 
example illustrated in Figure 1: the contractor receives a fixed payment for rectifying failures 
during one year. A clause states that if the contractor’s cost of rectifying one failure is above 
SEK 10 000, the contractor will be reimbursed the amount above SEK 10 000. Hence, if the 
total cost of rectifying one failure is SEK 15 000, the contractor will be reimbursed SEK 5 000. 
A higher cost-cap in Figure 1 implies that the contractor is reimbursed less. This reimbursement 
rule varies between contracts, creating different levels of power in the incentives. The same 
type of reimbursement rule is used for maintenance activities that prevent infrastructure 
failures, i.e. for fixing a defect before it becomes a failure. 
 
 
Figure 1 – Illustration of the reimbursement rule 
 
Apart from capping the contractor’s cost for some activities, the contracts also include a bonus 
and/or penalty linked to the number of failures in the maintenance area. These are tilted towards 
SEK 10K 
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑒  𝑏𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 
𝑅𝑒𝑖𝑚𝑏𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡  𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒: 
Cost-cap=SEK 10K 
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒 SEK 15K 
7 
 
failures that cause train delays, which imply that an average train delay failure will have a larger 
impact on the bonus or penalty compared to an average failure not causing a train delay. For 
example, a contract using a performance index has the weight 1.8 for train delays while the 
weight is 1 for other failures and 0.2 for a measure of track geometry. Other contracts have 
bonuses and/or penalties linked to target values for train delays while failures not causing a 
train delay are excluded.3 In summary, the contracts are designed so that a contractor prefers a 
failure that is not causing train delays instead of a train delay failure. This will tilt the 
contractor’s maintenance strategy towards preventing failures causing train delays. For 
example, consider a situation where two defects are found that have the same expected 
corrective maintenance cost, but one defect is more likely to cause train delays than the other 
(which can be due to the type or the severity of the defect). The contractor will then benefit 
more by first fixing the defect that is more likely to cause train delays, which increases the 
probability of the other defect to become a failure. Still, the number of other failures must be 
handled in order to cap the risk of them causing train delays (for example, fixing failures require 
time slots on the tracks, and trains will eventually need to be rescheduled when the number of 
failures grows), which means that not all effort can be allocated to the prevention of train 
delaying failures. 
In this paper, performance refers to the number of infrastructure failures that needs to 
be fixed immediately or within two weeks. There are other types of infrastructure quality 
indicators such as “minor” deviations in track geometry or other defects that require a 
preventive maintenance, i.e. maintenance that prevent infrastructure failures. Thus, a lack of 
preventive maintenance will result in a failure that requires corrective maintenance. 
Given the design of the contracts, we formulate the following research questions: 
 
3 There are also contracts that do not have any bonus connected to train delays. However, all procured maintenance 
contracts have a penalty for the contractor if a time limit to rectify a train delay failure is exceeded. For example, 




1. Do variations in the reimbursement rule affect the performance of maintenance 
contracts, measured as the frequency of failures? 
2. Do performance incentive schemes tilted against train delays have an effect on the 
relationship between the number of failures causing train delays and other failures? 
 
Below we present the dataset available for the analysis, followed by a presentation of the models 
to be estimated in order to answer the research questions and provide empirical evidence on the 
impact of the incentive structures. 
 
3.0 Data 
The Swedish railway network comprises about 16 500 track km, of which about 14 000 km is 
managed by the Swedish Transport Administration (which we hereafter refer to as the 
infrastructure manager, IM). The railway network is divided into 35 contract areas. The IM has 
provided copies of the signed contracts for these areas, which include information on the 
incentive structures with respect to infrastructure failures. The available information covers the 
period 2003-2013, during which maintenance has been gradually exposed to competitive 
tendering (starting in 2002 and as of 2013, 95 per cent of the railway network had been tendered 
in competition).  
Information on the number of infrastructure failures has also been collected from the 
IM. The data constitute all failures reported to the IM that needed to be fixed immediately or 
within two weeks, which is the Swedish IM’s definition of a failure. It is indicated in the data 
whether a failure has caused a train delay or not. Reports of failures come from the train 
management system and may emanate from operators, train drivers, maintenance personnel as 
well as the public. There are many different causes of failures. Some are strictly exogenous 
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with respect to maintenance such as animals or humans hit by a train, sabotage etc. These 
failures are out of the contractors’ control and are not included in the analysis, meaning that 
only failures occurring because of deterioration and/or poor maintenance of the infrastructure 
are analysed. 
Infrastructure characteristics such as track length, rail weight and quality class are part 
of our dataset, as well as traffic volume. These are important factors to control for when 
analysing the impact contract designs have on the frequency of failures. For example, rail 
weight is a quality indicator, where heavier rail is more resilient towards the damage 
mechanisms causing track deterioration (failures), while the quality class is linked to 
differences in linespeed and requirements on track geometry standards. The traffic information 
collected is gross ton density (ton-km/route-km), which from an engineering perspective is a 
key driver of wear and tear, i.e. infrastructure failures. 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for failures and the explanatory variables 
included in the estimations. The level of detail varies between our variables. The failures are 
reported to the IM at a very disaggregate level, with information on which station (or between 
which two stations) the failure was located. These parts of the tracks are called segments. Some 
of the segments have a short track length (for example 10 metres) as they only constitute a 
switch or a bridge, while some segments comprise several km of track. Information on rail 
weight and quality class is also reported for each segment. However, traffic volume is available 
at a more aggregate level, defined as track sections that on average include about 11 segments, 
while each contract area on average comprise about 6 track sections. The length relationship 





Table 1 - Data 2003-2013 
Variable (24 940 obs.) Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
SEG.: Failures, total 6.32 17.75 0 482 
SEG.: Failures, train delays 1.11 2.85 0 101 
SEG.: Failures, not train delays 5.22 15.47 0 413 
SEG.: Track length, metres 5 871 5 695 10 43 870 
SEG.: Rail weight, kg 51.58 5.68 27 63 
SEG.: Quality class, 0-5* 2.06 1.26 0 5 
SEC.: Traffic density, million gross tonnes** 8.29 8.62 0.00 49.79 
ARE.: Year tendered in competition, dummy 0.58 0.49 0 1 
ARE.: Mix between tend. and not tend. in comp., dummy 0.08 0.27 0 1 
     
Subset of data used for research question 1 (8 528 obs.)     
ARE.: Cost-cap, thousand SEK 7.66 4.04 5 20 
SEG.: Failures, total 5.95 15.11 0 482 
SEG.: Failures, train delays 1.12 2.85 0 101 
SEG.: Failures, not train delays 4.83 12.91 0 381 
SEG.: Track length, metres 6 052 6 262 10 43 077 
SEG.: Rail weight, kg 51.73 5.82 32 60 
SEG.: Quality class, 0-5* 2.01 1.32 0 5 
SEC.: Traffic density, million gross tonnes** 7.89 9.32 0.00 49.79 
SEG = Information available for segments, SEC = Information available for sections, ARE = Information available 
for contract areas, *A high value implies a low speed line with less strict requirement on track geometry standards 
compared to a high-speed line (Banverket 1997), **Traffic density = (Million gross ton-km/Route km) 
 
In total, we have 24 940 observations on the segments administered by the IM over the period 
2003-2013. However, only tendered contracts have a reimbursement rule (described in section 
2). This information is available for a third of the observations, with descriptive statistics in 
Table 1, indicating that the cost-cap (reimbursement rule) varies between SEK 5 000 and SEK 
20 000 per failure.4 Out of the 32 contract areas that are part of the dataset, five have been 
subject to a change in the cost-cap. The changes comprise increases in the cost-cap from SEK 
 
4 As an indication of what is required to reach the cost-caps, we consider a labour cost at around SEK 1000 per 
hour (and exclude costs for material). The lowest cost cap (SEK 5000) is then reached after 5 person hours, while 
the highest cost-cap requires 20 person hours. Indeed, minor failures can be solved without reaching the cost-cap, 
while more severe failures, requiring more person hours and material, will quickly reach the cost-cap. 
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5 000 to SEK 7 000, from SEK 5 000 to SEK 10 000, from SEK 8 000 to SEK 10 000, and 
from SEK 15 000 to SEK 18 000. 
For the tendered contracts, we note that the average number of failures per segment and 
year is 5.95, while the average for a contract is 354.84 failures per year. Specifically, we use 
this subset of the data to answer research question 1. The entire dataset can be used for research 
question 2. The reason is that the number of failures prior to competitive tendering are used to 
evaluate the effect of the performance incentive schemes, which are tilted towards failures 
causing train delays (see description of models and estimation method below). Here we can 
note that there are on average 2505 failures per year causing train delays, while the average per 
segment and year is 1.11 (as indicated in Table 1). The corresponding figures for failures not 
causing train delays is 14337 per year and 5.22 per segment and year. 
During 2003-2009 a train had to be delayed more than 5 minutes between two stations 
for a failure causing the delay to be reported as such. This definition was changed to 3 minutes 
in 2010. To consistently analyse the number of train delay failures during 2003-2013, we only 
include failures causing more than a 5-minute delay. Failures causing less than 5 minutes of 
delay are therefore defined as a regular failure in this study. Furthermore, we were not able to 
get consistent information about the knock-on effects of a first train being delayed, meaning 
that it is impossible to report the total number of delay minutes per failure from the available 
data. 
In the analysis of the reimbursement rule we exclude the contracts that are not 
performance based, which are primarily used for the newly built railway lines. Moreover, we 
exclude yards when analysing train delay failures because these are exempted from the 





4.0 Models and estimation method 
We use three different models to answer our research questions. The first model considers the 
reimbursement rule, and the second and third models address the impact of tilted performance 
schemes. The total number of failures (𝑓𝑖𝑡) is the dependent variable in the first model, and 
comprise failures that caused train delays (𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑇) and other failures that did not cause train delays 
(𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑂), that is 𝑓𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑇 + 𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑂. The number of failures consists of non-negative discrete values, 
i.e. it is a count variable. We therefore use count data models, where we consider the first model 
to have the following (exponential) conditional mean: 
 𝐸[𝑓𝑖𝑡│ ∑ 𝑥𝑘𝑖𝑡𝐾𝑘=1 , 𝑐𝑖𝑡, 𝛼𝑖] =  𝛼𝑖𝑒𝑥𝑝(∑ 𝑥𝑘𝑖𝑡𝐾𝑘=1 𝛽𝑘 + 𝜇𝑐𝑖𝑡),   (1) 
 
where 𝑡 = 1, . . , 𝑇(𝑖) years, and 𝑖 indicates the individual segments. 𝛼𝑖 is segment-specific 
effects, and 𝛽𝑘 is a vector of parameters for the effect of the explanatory variables ∑ 𝑥𝑘𝑖𝑡𝐾𝑘=1 , 
which include variables for the infrastructure characteristics, traffic volume and year dummy 
variables. 𝑐𝑖𝑡 is the cost-cap linked to the reimbursement rule and 𝜇 its parameter. Recall that a 
higher cost-cap implies that the contractor is reimbursed less for a failure that is costly to rectify. 
Our hypothesis is that a higher cost-cap will reduce the number of failures: 
 𝐻𝑦𝑝𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑠 1: 𝜇 < 0 
 
considering that the contractor then has a stronger incentive to prevent failures from occurring, 
i.e. it induces effort. However, the effect of the reimbursement rule can also be due to a selection 
effect, with more efficient contractors being awarded contracts with a high power in the 
incentive scheme. From a policy perspective, varying cost caps that generate a selection effect 
can be beneficial for the client, as it creates active inefficient types which lowers the efficient 
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types’ ability to extract rent.5 If it is not considered in the estimation, a selection effect would, 
however, result in a biased estimate on the effect the cost cap has on inducing effort. A selection 
effect does not seem to be present in our data, where for example two out of three contractors 
with the highest cost-caps (SEK 15 000 to SEK 20 0000) also have contracts with the lowest 
caps (SEK 5 000 to SEK 8 000), but we still consider a possible effect on our cost-cap 
coefficient in the estimation of our model (see section 4.1). 
 The number of failures causing train delays (𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑇) is the dependent variable in the second 
model, with a conditional mean expressed as 
  𝐸[𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑇│ ∑ 𝑥𝑘𝑖𝑡𝐾𝑘=1 , 𝐷𝑖𝑡, 𝛼𝑖] = 𝛼𝑖𝑒𝑥𝑝(∑ 𝑥𝑘𝑖𝑡𝐾𝑘=1 𝛽𝑘 + 𝜗𝑇𝐷𝑖𝑡)  (2) 
 
while the number of other failures (not causing train delays; 𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑂) is the dependent variable in 
the third model 
 𝐸[𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑂│ ∑ 𝑥𝑘𝑖𝑡𝐾𝑘=1 , 𝐷𝑖𝑡, 𝛼𝑖] = 𝛼𝑖𝑒𝑥𝑝(∑ 𝑥𝑘𝑖𝑡𝐾𝑘=1 𝛽𝑘 + 𝜗𝑂𝐷𝑖𝑡)  (3) 
 
To evaluate the effect of tilted performance schemes, we use a dummy variable (𝐷𝑖𝑡) in the 
second and third model, indicating when a maintenance area is tendered in competition – that 
is, it is used as a proxy for a change in the effect of tilted performance incentive schemes. The 
reason for this estimation approach is that there is no point in time when performance incentive 
schemes were introduced. For example, there are examples of performance clauses in contracts 
 
5 As Laffont and Tirole (1993, p. 71) writes: “one could conclude that high-powered incentive schemes (…) are 
better because they induce better performance. While the second statement is correct, the first ignores the 
desirability of rent extraction. Optimal screening of the firm’s technology yields over the sample good 
performances and high-powered schemes together with poor performances and low-powered schemes.” 
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awarded to the in-house production unit prior to the introduction of competitive tendering. It is 
reasonable to assume that in-house production in general had some sort of incentive structure 
to reduce train delays. We can however use the sampling benefit from competitive tendering, 
which imply that it is more likely that the chosen contractor is efficient (see for example 
Armstrong and Sappington 2007, chapter 4). This is also suggested by the results in Odolinski 
and Smith (2016), showing that competitive tendering reduced maintenance cost in Sweden 
with about 11 per cent (which of course also can be explained by other factors than just the 
sampling benefit). Put differently, the tilted performance schemes induce effort towards failures 
causing train delays, and a more efficient contractor will thus use relatively more effort than 
the less efficient contractor. Our hypothesis is therefore that the use of competitive tendering 
will increase the effect of the tilted performance incentive schemes. The parameters 𝜗𝑇 and 𝜗𝑂 
in equations 2 and 3, respectively, should differ. Hence, we state the following hypothesis: 
 𝐻𝑦𝑝𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑠 2: 𝜗𝑇 < 𝜗𝑂 
 
4.1 Selection bias 
In Model 1, we include dummy variables for contractors to test if there is a selection effect 
(efficient contractors choosing contracts with high cost-caps) that has an impact on our 
coefficient for incentive intensity (𝜇). Moreover, there might be a selection bias in Models 2 
and 3. Specifically, the maintenance of the Swedish railway network was gradually put out to 
tender, with the first contract tendered in 2002 and the last part of the network tendered in 
competition in 2014. The estimates from the tendering dummy variables in Model 2 and 3 will 
be biased if there are systematic differences between areas tendered first and tendered later that 
are not controlled by the independent variables; omitted variable bias will be present. A 
selection bias can also be present if we have reverse causality; if areas tendered first were 
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tendered because they had high (low) probability of certain failures to occur. This issue is also 
addressed in Odolinski and Smith (2016), Domberger et al. (1987) and Smith and Wheat (2012). 
We use the same approach and include a vector of dummy variables in the estimations: 
 𝑧𝑘𝑖𝑡 = [𝐷𝑘𝑖 , 𝐷𝑘𝑖𝑡, 𝐷𝑀𝑖 , 𝐷𝑌; 𝝑]     (4) 
 
where 𝑘 = 𝐶 indicate when a segment is tendered in competition, 𝑘 = 𝐹 when tendered during 
2002-2004 for the first time and 𝑘 = 𝐿 when tendered during 2005-2013 for the first time. The 
time period before tendered in competition is indicated by 𝑡 = 𝐵 and 𝑡 = 𝑂 when tendered in 
competition and onwards. The dummy variable 𝐷𝑀𝑖 is used for the year when the transition 
from not tendered to tendered takes place, i.e. the first year an area is tendered. 𝑧𝑘𝑖𝑡 also includes 
year dummies (𝑘 = 𝑌 = 2004, … ,2013). 𝝑 are parameters to be estimated. 
As a robustness test of Model 2 and Model 3, we estimate 𝜗𝐹𝐵𝑖, 𝜗𝐹𝑂𝑖 and 𝜗𝐿𝑂𝑖 and test 
if 𝜗𝐹𝐵𝑖 = 0, which would imply that, before the areas were tendered, we have no systematic 
difference between areas tendered first (in 2002-2004) compared to areas tendered later (in 
2005-2013) and areas not tendered during 2003-2013.6  
 
4.2 Regression model 
We use count data regression models with the conditional means expressed in eq. (1)-(3).7 First, 
we note that we have overdispersion in our data (variance greater than the mean), which can be 
explained by a large fraction of the observations having a zero value, as indicated by Figure 2 
 
6 The definition of areas tendered first is arbitrary because the exposure to competition was gradual, and we 
therefore perform sensitivity tests with respect to this definition. 
7
 See for example Hausman et al. (1984) or Hilbe (2011) for specifications of the log-likelihood functions for the 
Poisson and the negative binomial models. 
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below.8 In this case, the negative binomial model is a useful regression model, in which the 
conditional mean is not equal to the conditional variance. We therefore estimate a negative 
binomial regression model on a panel data set stretching from 2003-2013 
 Pr (𝑓𝑖𝑡│ ∑ 𝑥𝑘𝑖𝑡𝐾𝑘=1 , 𝛼𝑖, 𝛿𝑖)      (5) 
 
where 𝑓𝑖𝑡 is the count of failures, 𝑖 = track segment 1,2, … , 𝑁 and 𝑡 = year 1,2 … , 𝑇(𝑖).  𝛼𝑖 is 
the individual effect as specified in (6) and 𝛿𝑖 is the dispersion parameter in the model, where 
it is assumed that 1 (1 + 𝛿𝑖)⁄ ~𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(𝑟, 𝑠). ∑ 𝑥𝑘𝑖𝑡𝐾𝑘=1  is a vector of 𝑘 explanatory variables, 
including the cost cap variable in Model 1, and the policy dummy variables 𝑧𝑘𝑖𝑡 in Models 2 
and 3. Track length is an important exposure variable in the models. We expect the coefficient 
for track length to not be significantly different from 1, meaning that a segment with track 
length 2 km is twice as likely to have a failure as a segment with track length 1 km, ceteris 
paribus. 
We use the negative binomial random effects model, considering that Allison and 
Waterman (2002) found that the negative binomial model with conditional fixed effects, 
proposed by Hausman et al. (1984), is not a true fixed effects estimator. The Poisson conditional 
fixed effects estimator (that is, without the dispersion parameter in (5)) is also considered as it 
relies on weaker distributional assumptions compared to the negative binomial model (Cameron 
and Trivedi (2005)). The Poisson model can therefore be preferred when modelling the mean, 
yet the negative binomial model can be preferred in predicting certain probabilities. 
 
 
8 The overdispersion in Figure 2 is estimated from the pooled negative binomial model and is significantly different 




Figure 2 – Proportions of observations: observed, Poisson- and negative binomial 
probability 
 
To deal with the problem of inconsistent estimates if the regressors are not independent of the 
individual effects 𝛼𝑖 in the negative binomial random effect model, we use a solution first 
proposed by Mundlak (1978), and specify the individual specific effect as 
 𝛼𝑖 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (∑ ?̅?𝑘𝑖𝐾𝑘=1 𝛾𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖)    (6) 
 
where ?̅?𝑘𝑖 = 𝑇−1 ∑ 𝑥𝑘𝑖𝑡𝑇𝑡=1  for each 𝑘 = 1 … 𝐾 (all time-varying explanatory variables in our 
estimations). 𝜀𝑖 is unobserved heterogeneity not correlated with our regressors. Using (6) we 
express (1)-(3) (including the cost-cap and dummy variables in ∑ 𝑥𝑘𝑖𝑡𝐾𝑘=1 ) as 
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where we control for the correlation between 𝛼𝑖 and our regressors ∑ 𝑥𝑘𝑖𝑡𝐾𝑘=1  via  ∑ ?̅?𝑘𝑖𝐾𝑘=1 . 
Moreover, we avoid collinearity between ∑ 𝑥𝑘𝑖𝑡𝐾𝑘=1  and ∑ ?̅?𝑘𝑖𝐾𝑘=1  by using deviations from the 
mean. 
A variable for different cost levels for compensation when rectifying a failure, i.e. the 
cost-cap linked to the reimbursement rule, is included in Model 1. The specification in equation 
(7) implies that we estimate ‘within-effects’ of changes in the cost-cap. Hence, we control for 
unobserved (time-invariant) heterogeneity between the contract areas that might explain the use 
of different cost-caps. 
Dummy variables (𝑧𝑘𝑖𝑡) for competitive tendering are included in Models 2 and 3. 
Specifically, we include year dummies and a dummy variable for when a track segment belongs 
to a contract area tendered in competition, as well as a dummy variable indicating when there 
is a transition from not tendered to tendered in competition (which in most cases does not 
happen in the beginning of a calendar year). As we do not have a general post-tendering period 
(exposure to competition was gradual), we use the year dummy variables to control for general 
effects that occur over time, which leaves the time-specific tendering variable to pick up the 
impact of tendering. In line with the difference-in-differences approach, we also include a 
dummy variable indicating all areas tendered in competition sometime during 2003-2013 along 
with the time-specific tendering variable. As described in section 4.1, we also test the presence 
of selection bias. 
 
5.0 Results 
The model results are ?̂?(𝑥)𝑖𝑡 and ?̂?(𝑥 + 1)𝑖𝑡, which means that we estimate the expected value 
of failures when the explanatory variable 𝑥𝑖𝑡 increases with one unit. The estimated coefficient 
is then ?̂? = ln [?̂?(𝑥+1)𝑖𝑡?̂?(𝑥)𝑖𝑡 ], and 𝑒?̂? is an incidence ratio (IRR), expressed as  ?̂?(𝑥+1)𝑖𝑡?̂?(𝑥)𝑖𝑡 . Hence, an 
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IRR<1 indicates a negative effect. The incidence ratios are reported in Tables 2 and 3 together 
with standard errors for the estimated coefficients ?̂?. All estimations are carried out with Stata 
12 (StataCorp.2011). 
 
5.1 Econometric results: Model 1 
Table 2 shows the results from the estimations of the first model, which include results from 
both the random effects model and the preferred correlated random effects model (with terms 
as specified in equation (7)). In the latter model, the coefficients for variables averaged over 
time are denoted ‘between estimates’ while the other coefficients are denoted ‘within estimates’ 
(referring to effects between and within segments, respectively). 
Track length, which is the exposure variable, has the expected IRR of 1. The estimations 
also include a squared term for million gross tonne density, and the estimates reflect a non-
linear relationship with the number of failures, which is shown by both the within and between 
estimate in the correlated random effects model. Note that only the period 2004-2013 is 
included in this estimation due to missing data with respect to the reimbursement rule, which 
means that we include year dummy variables for 2005-2013. We tested the average values over 
time for the year dummy variables in the estimation because we have an unbalanced panel 
(Wooldridge, 2013), but these were not jointly significant and dropped from the estimation. 
Turning to the ‘within estimate’ for the cost-cap, we see that it has a negative effect on 
the number of failures (IRR=0.9614, p-value=0.000); we cannot reject 𝐻𝑦𝑝𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑠 1 which is 
related to research question 1. The incidence rate ratio at 0.9614 indicates that an increase in 
the cost-cap with one unit (in our case with SEK 1000) will reduce the number of failures with 
(100*(1-0.961)=) 3.9 percent. The average number of failures per contract and year is 355 in 
the sample (there are on average 59.6 segments per contract area and about 5.95 failures per 
segment). Hence, the estimated effect of a marginal increase in the cost-cap implies around 13.8 
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fewer failures per year for the average contract. Increasing the level of the cost-cap with one 
standard deviation (SEK 4 000), would imply about 55 fewer failures per year, which can be 
compared to the average of 355 failures per contract and year.  
 
Table 2 - Results Model 1 
 
Random effects Correlated Random effects 
 
IRR Std. Err. IRR Std. Err. 
Constant 0.0000*** 0.0000 0.0000*** 0.0000 
Cost-cap 0.9972 0.0050 0.9614*** 0.0095 
Rail weight 1.8074*** 0.1278 1.5163*** 0.2059 
(Rail weight)^2 0.9883*** 0.0013 0.9920*** 0.0026 
Quality class 1.0264 0.0225 1.0014 0.0431 
Track length 1.0000*** 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 
Million gross ton density 1.0917*** 0.0076 1.0400*** 0.0123 
(Million gross ton density)^2 0.9971*** 0.0004 0.9985*** 0.0006 
D.year2005 1.5806*** 0.1920 1.4878*** 0.1750 
D.year2006 1.4409*** 0.1720 1.3851*** 0.1601 
D.year2007 1.7515*** 0.2072 1.7426*** 0.1999 
D.year2008 1.6040*** 0.1895 1.5949*** 0.1828 
D.year2009 1.4920*** 0.1761 1.5073*** 0.1729 
D.year2010 1.4200*** 0.1675 1.4492*** 0.1662 
D.year2011 1.4428*** 0.1702 1.4444*** 0.1656 
D.year2012 1.4443*** 0.1707 1.4544*** 0.1675 
D.year2013 1.5331*** 0.1810 1.5475*** 0.1787 𝑇−1 ∑ Cost‐ cap𝑇𝑡=1   - - 1.0077 0.0057 𝑇−1 ∑ Rail weight𝑇𝑡=1   - - 1.8926*** 0.1561 𝑇−1 ∑ (Rail weight𝑇𝑡=1 )^2  - - 0.9872 0.0016 𝑇−1 ∑ Quality class𝑇𝑡=1   - - 1.0344 0.0280 𝑇−1 ∑ Track length𝑇𝑡=1    - - 1.0001*** 0.0000 𝑇−1 ∑ Million gross ton density𝑇𝑡=1   - - 1.1141*** 0.0094 𝑇−1 ∑ (Million gross ton density)^2𝑇𝑡=1   - - 0.9965*** 0.0004 
***, **, *: Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively 
Log likelihood: Random effects model= -18 844.355, Correlated Random effects model= -18 810.507 




We included dummy variables for contractors to test if there is a selection effect 
generating a biased estimate of the effect the cost-cap has on inducing effort. This did not have 
a significant impact on the cost-cap estimate (the IRR is then 0.9515 with p-value 0.000). 
Moreover, we also estimate the model using Poisson conditional fixed effects, considering that 
it relies on weaker distributional assumptions than the negative binomial model. The results are 
presented in Table 4 in the appendix, showing a similar effect of the cost-cap: The IRR is 0.9727 
and statistically significant (p-value 0.033). 
 
5.2 Econometric results: Model 2 and Model 3 
The estimation results from Model 2 and Model 3 using correlated random effects are presented 
in Table 3. In Model 2, the number of failures causing train delays is used as the dependent 
variable. The dependent variable in Model 3 is failures not causing a train delay. 
The effects of rail weight, track length and traffic are similar to the results in Model 1. 
However, the IRR for quality class (a high number indicates low line speeds) is positive and 
statistically significant in the model for failures causing train delays. That is, these failures are 
more frequent on tracks with low line speeds (tracks with poor track geometry standards).  
Importantly, there are differences in the effect of the competitive tendering between 
Model 2 and Model 3 according to the estimation results. In Model 2, the IRR for competitive 
tendering (“D.Year tendered in competition”), is 0.9593 (p-value=0.191) with a 95 per cent 
confidence interval at [0.9014, 1.0209], which indicates a negative effect on the number of 
failures causing train delays, yet not statistically significant. The IRR for competitive tendering 
in Model 3 is 1.0696 (p-value=0.000) with a 95 per cent confidence interval at [1.0321, 1.1086], 
which implies that the number of failures that has not caused a train delay is increasing when 
tendered in competition. The lower parameter estimate in Model 2 compared to 3, and more 
importantly the non-overlapping 95 per cent confidence intervals, implies that we cannot 
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reject 𝐻𝑦𝑝𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑠 2, which is linked to research question 2. Considering that there were on 
average 2505 failures causing train delays per year (1.11 per segment), the impact of the 
performance scheme imply (2505*(1-0.9593=) 102 fewer failures causing train delays per year 
(keeping in mind that the estimate was not statistically significant). This can be compared to 
the impact on the other failures, which corresponds to (14337*(1.0729-1)=) 998 more failures 
per year (based on 14337 failures per year). 
Note that we include a dummy variable indicating all segments tendered sometime 
during 2003-2013 to control for any general feature among these segments that also apply 
before tendering. The corresponding IRR is above one in both models, but not statistically 
significant (p-values at 0.787 and 0.824 in the respective models). Moreover, no selection bias 
was found using the dummy variable approach described in section 4.1. That is, the parameter 
estimate of interest 𝜗𝐹𝐵𝑖 is not significantly different from zero (p-value=0.872 and 0.204 in 
Model 2 and 3 respectively). 
Results from the Poisson conditional fixed effects models are presented in the appendix, 
showing that the IRR for competitive tendering (“D.Year tendered in competition”), is 0.9983 
and not statistically significant for failures causing train delays (p-value =0.973), while it is 
1.0871 and statistically significant for other failures, which is in line with the negative binomial 
model results.  
23 
 
Table 3 - Results Model 2 and 3: Correlated Random Effects 
 
Model 2 - Train delay failures Model 3 - Other failures 
 
IRR Std. Err. IRR Std. Err. 
Constant 0.0000*** 0.0000 0.0000*** 0.0000 
D.Mix tendered and not tendered in comp. 1.0132 0.0336 1.0460** 0.0196 
D.Year tendered in competition 0.9593 0.0305 1.0696*** 0.0195 
D.If tendered in comp. in 2003-2013 1.1147 0.4478 1.0525 0.2425 
Rail weight 1.4952*** 0.1778 0.9775 0.0531 
(Rail weight)^2 0.9919*** 0.0022 1.0000 0.0010 
Quality class 1.0793** 0.0401 1.0077 0.0204 
Track length 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 
Million gross ton density 1.0513*** 0.0118 1.0329*** 0.0070 
(Million gross ton density)^2 0.9988*** 0.0005 0.9985*** 0.0003 
D.year2004 0.8994*** 0.0353 0.9148*** 0.0194 
D.year2005 0.9352* 0.0366 0.8503*** 0.0185 
D.year2006 0.9411 0.0374 0.8301*** 0.0185 
D.year2007 1.1399*** 0.0446 1.0471** 0.0227 
D.year2008 1.0517 0.0441 0.9802 0.0227 
D.year2009 0.9906 0.0435 0.9802 0.0235 
D.year2010 1.2507*** 0.0553 0.9242*** 0.0232 
D.year2011 1.3211*** 0.0602 0.8749*** 0.0230 
D.year2012 1.2209*** 0.0573 0.7621*** 0.0208 
D.year2013 1.3843*** 0.0647 0.7974*** 0.0219 𝑇−1 ∑ D. Mix tend. and not tend. in comp.𝑇𝑡=1   2.6137* 1.3885 2.1869** 0.8187 𝑇−1 ∑ D. Year tendered in competition 𝑇𝑡=1   0.9615 0.0967 0.9849 0.0793 𝑇−1 ∑ D. If tend. in comp. in 2003 − 2013𝑇𝑡=1   0.9921 0.1199 1.0354 0.1007 𝑇−1 ∑ Rail weight 𝑇𝑡=1   2.9059*** 0.2435 1.9981*** 0.1207 
(𝑇−1 ∑ Rail weight𝑇𝑡=1 )^2 0.9793*** 0.0016 0.9863*** 0.0011 𝑇−1 ∑ Quality class 𝑇𝑡=1   0.9669 0.0220 1.0453** 0.0197 𝑇−1 ∑ Track length 𝑇𝑡=1   1.0000*** 0.0000 1.0000*** 0.0000 𝑇−1 ∑ Million gross ton density𝑇𝑡=1   1.1775*** 0.0092 1.1004*** 0.0072 𝑇−1 ∑ (Million gross ton density)^2𝑇𝑡=1   0.9939*** 0.0004 0.9963*** 0.0004 
***, **, *: Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively 
Note: year dummy variables 𝑇−1 ∑ D. year2004𝑇𝑡=1  to 𝑇−1 ∑ D. year2013 𝑇𝑡=1 are jointly significant and included 
in the estimations, but dropped from Table 3 for expositional convenience. 
Log likelihood: Model 2 = -27 527.569, Model 3 = -51 306.639 






The design of contracts is vital for the outcome of the maintenance projects, which places high 
demands on the IM as a client. The presence of hidden information and hidden action can result 
in inefficient outcomes if not judiciously handled. Incentive contracts linear in costs can be used 
to alleviate the problems incurred by these information asymmetries. Indeed, this type of 
contract is used by the IM in the tendering of maintenance contracts in Sweden, where different 
reimbursement rules (cost-caps) have been used over the years of competitive tendering 
creating different incentive intensities.  The estimation results show that an increase in the cost-
cap (higher incentive intensity as the contractor is reimbursed less) reduces the number of 
infrastructure failures. The estimated impact is substantial, considering that a one standard 
deviation increase (SEK 4000) in the cost-cap imply 55 fewer failures per year and contract 
area, which is about 15 per cent of the total number of failures per year and contract area. Here, 
we can note that all the changes made with respect to the reimbursement rule have been 
increases in the cost-cap. That is, the IM have chosen to increase the incentive intensity in the 
contracts. 
Does this result imply that we should have a high cost-cap in all maintenance contracts? 
Not necessarily. A high cost-cap indicates that we move closer to a fixed price contract which 
induces effort, but this will make it easier for the efficient contractor to extract rent. Moreover, 
we will have a low level of competition if inefficient types do not take part in the bidding when 
the cost-caps are too high, with the efficient type(s) being able to extract higher rents. Still, the 
estimated impact of increased incentive intensity can be used in the pursuit of a desired balance 
between the expected number of infrastructure failures and the expected cost of a maintenance 
contract. The next step is thus to evaluate how different levels of the cost-caps affects 
maintenance costs.  
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There might be possibilities for the contractors to misguide the IM on the number of 
failures and/or the cost of solving a failure. If we assume that it is difficult to misreport the costs 
of solving a failure, a contractor might then report several failures as one failure in order to 
reach the cost-cap. This could imply that our cost-cap coefficient is overestimated, considering 
that a higher cap would require more failures to be collected in the report to the IM. On the 
other hand, if it is easy to misguide the IM on the cost of solving a failure, then there is no 
incentive to understate the number of failures (assuming the contractors’ success in misguiding 
the IM is not dependent on the stated cost level per failure). The contractor could in this case 
choose to exaggerate the number of failures and/or overstate the cost of each failure, where the 
mix depends on its effectiveness. This would reduce the effect of the cost-cap, and our 
coefficient is then underestimated compared to a case with no misreports. Moreover, the benefit 
of preventing a failure is reduced if it is easy to misguide the IM on costs, which would lead to 
more (actual) failures. In fact, a contractor could in theory cover its cost of solving a failure (the 
part below the cost-cap) by stating a higher cost for higher caps, making the level of the cap 
irrelevant for the incentive to prevent failures. That is, the number of actual failures would not 
vary with the cost-cap for contractors that misguide the IM on the true costs. Again, the 
estimated effect of the cost-cap coefficient is then underestimated; it would be higher (result in 
fewer failures) if the IM implemented (more) cost monitoring measures. 
An important task of the contractors is to prevent infrastructure failures that are causing 
train delays. A robust and reliable railway infrastructure is an objective often stated by the IM. 
Undeniably, this objective is reflected in the design of the maintenance contracts, with 
performance incentive schemes tilted towards failures causing train delays. This makes it 
beneficial for the contractors to focus on this group of infrastructure failures. The estimation 
results confirm our hypothesis, suggesting that effort is tilted towards preventing failures 
causing train delays at the expense of preventing other failures.  
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Are the performance incentive schemes beneficial with respect to the performance of 
the railway infrastructure? Unfortunately, we are not able to answer this question. For example, 
we do not have consistent information on total train delay minutes that each failure caused, 
which is an important overall measure of railway performance. A reduction in the number of 
train delay failures does not per se imply that the number of train delay minutes has decreased. 
Nevertheless, it is fair to say that a reduction in the number of failures causing train delays is a 
good sign of improved performance (note, however, that the estimate was not statistically 
significant). Still, the number of failures not causing a train delay has increased quite 
substantially due to the tilted performance schemes, and the estimated effect was statistically 
significant. The estimated impact corresponds to 998 more failures per year for the railway 
network in our sample, while the estimated decrease in the number of failures causing train 
delays is 102 per year. Possible consequences of this observation need to be further studied, 
especially since it signals a deteriorating asset condition. For example, what is the impact on 
the life-cycle cost of the infrastructure when the number of failures (not causing train delays) 
increase? This should be compared to the impact on delay costs due to the decrease in failures 
causing train delays. This is especially relevant considering the negative experience in Britain 
where misaligned incentive structures arguably led to a deteriorating asset condition. 
 
7.0 Conclusion 
This paper offers evidence on the effect of different contract designs in rail maintenance 
services. It contributes to the existing literature by providing empirical evidence on the marginal 
effect of incentive intensity in the rail maintenance contracts, as well as the effect of tilted 
performance incentive schemes. Specifically, the results show that a higher incentive intensity 




The econometric test of the tilted performance incentive schemes confirms our 
hypothesis that it influences the relationship between the number of failures causing train delays 
and other failures. We can conclude that this contract design seems to have been beneficial with 
respect to the number of train delay failures, yet at the expense of other types of failures which 
have increased significantly. This increase indicates a deteriorating asset and it can have an 
impact on the life-cycle cost of the infrastructure; an effect that needs to be evaluated and 
compared with the benefit of fewer failures causing train delays. 
Our findings are informative in considerations on the design of railway maintenance 
contracts, especially for other IMs across Europe that plan to use (or are already using) 
competitive tendering. Setting a low incentive intensity can be costly for the IM with respect to 
the number of failures that occur, while a high incentive intensity can induce rent extraction. 
This result can be used when making a trade-off between the expected number of failures and 
the expected maintenance cost of the contract. Moreover, when using tilted performance 
incentive schemes, the IM needs to contemplate the reallocation of attention from other tasks. 
For example, its effect on future maintenance costs needs to be estimated and compared with 
the (short-run) decrease in user (delay) costs. In general, the effect of different designs on cost 
efficiency in railway maintenance - considering both user and producer costs - is an area for 
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Table 4 - Results Model 1: Poisson conditional fixed effects 
 
IRR Std. Err. [95 % Conf. Interval] 
Cost-cap 0.9727** 0.0127 0.9481 0.9978 
Rail weight 1.5907*** 0.2625 1.1511 2.1982 
(Rail weight)^2 0.9911*** 0.0031 0.9850 0.9972 
Quality class 1.0407 0.0562 0.9361 1.1569 
Track length 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Million gross ton density 1.0479*** 0.0143 1.0204 1.0762 
(Million gross ton density)^2 0.9982*** 0.0006 0.9971 0.9993 
D.year2005 1.5147*** 0.1883 1.1872 1.9327 
D.year2006 1.3949*** 0.1792 1.0844 1.7943 
D.year2007 1.7151*** 0.2206 1.3329 2.2069 
D.year2008 1.6101*** 0.2063 1.2526 2.0697 
D.year2009 1.4999*** 0.1924 1.1664 1.9287 
D.year2010 1.4805*** 0.1893 1.1523 1.9021 
D.year2011 1.4497*** 0.1873 1.1255 1.8674 
D.year2012 1.4464*** 0.1886 1.1201 1.8676 
D.year2013 1.4821*** 0.1956 1.1442 1.9196 
***, **, *: Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively 
Log likelihood: -12 575.699 





Table 5 - Results Model 2 and 3: Poisson conditional fixed effects 
 
Model 2 - Train delay failures Model 3 - Other failures 
 
IRR Rob. Std. Err. IRR Rob. Std. Err. 
D.Mix tendered and not tendered in comp. 1.0414 0.0437 1.0888*** 0.0268 
D.Year tendered in competition 0.9983 0.0490 1.0871*** 0.0281 
D.If tendered in comp. in 2003-2013 1.0334 0.5573 0.9826 0.3565 
Rail weight 1.4809 0.3710 0.9544 0.1497 
(Rail weight)^2 0.9921* 0.0047 1.0005 0.0031 
Quality class 1.1216 0.0818 1.0280 0.0444 
Track length 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 
Million gross ton density 1.0361** 0.0170 1.0232* 0.0134 
(Million gross ton density)^2 0.9993 0.0007 0.9990* 0.0006 
D.year2004 0.9178** 0.0348 0.8982*** 0.0177 
D.year2005 0.9318 0.0447 0.8340*** 0.0232 
D.year2006 0.9346 0.0402 0.8005*** 0.0220 
D.year2007 1.1136** 0.0557 0.9805 0.0316 
D.year2008 1.0264 0.0617 0.9333** 0.0314 
D.year2009 0.9478 0.0621 0.9342* 0.0329 
D.year2010 1.2041*** 0.0739 0.8938*** 0.0335 
D.year2011 1.2692*** 0.0839 0.8580*** 0.0329 
D.year2012 1.1417** 0.0765 0.7402*** 0.0298 
D.year2013 1.3246*** 0.0882 0.7384*** 0.0327 
***, **, *: Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively 
Log likelihood: Model 2 = -20 561.523, Model 3 = -42 150.520 
Number of observations: 19 561 in Model 2 and 23 527 Model 3. 
 
